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A PARTISAN DISTRICTING PROTOCOL
WITH PROVABLY NONPARTISAN OUTCOMES
WESLEY PEGDEN, ARIEL D. PROCACCIA, AND DINGLI YU
Abstract. We design and analyze a protocol for dividing a state into districts,
where parties take turns proposing a division, and freezing a district from the
other party’s proposed division. We show that our protocol has predictable
and provable guarantees for both the number of districts in which each party
has a majority of supporters, and the extent to which either party has the
power to pack a specific population into a single district.
1. Introduction
In the American system of democracy, local representatives from a state are
elected to the national House of Representatives in direct local elections, held in
districts of (roughly) equal population. These Congressional districts of a state are
redrawn every 10 years, following the decennial census.
Because the Congressional representatives of a state are elected in local district
elections, there is no guarantee that the political makeup of the state’s elected slate
of representatives will mirror the political composition of statewide vote casts in
the election. In practice, this seemingly desirable target is missed by a wide mark;
for example, in Pennsylvania in 2012, 51% of the population voted for Democrat
representatives, yet Republican representatives won 13 out of 18 district elections.
This phenomenon, popularly known as gerrymandering —where political parties
carefully draw districts to maximize their advantage in election outcomes — has
been studied on several fronts. Researchers have worked to propose simple tests to
quantify gerrymandering with greater granularity than the election outcomes pro-
vide [12, 10], and to distinguish gerrymandering from natural artifacts of political
geography [4, 1, 5].
In some states, there has been an earnest effort to reduce political influence
over the districting process through the establishment of independent redistricting
commissions. For example, in Arizona, redistricting is currently carried out by a
commission composed of 10 Democrats, 10 Republicans and 5 Independents.
Our goal in this paper is to propose and analyze a protocol for fair redistricting
that can be carried out without “independent” agents; in particular, a redistricting
commission using our protocol can be composed of an even number of members,
drawn from the two major political parties of the state. Districting with our pro-
tocol would enable reasonable districts to be drawn for a state without requiring
effective mechanisms identifying truly independent agents.
Motivated by classical cake-cutting problems with “I-cut-you-choose” types of
solutions [2, 11], our algorithm leverages competition between two political entities
to create a reasonable districting in a turn-based protocol. We will prove that our
protocol has desirable properties in idealized settings.
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2. Setting and results
We consider the districting problem as a competition between two parties. A
state will be modeled as a continuously divisible object, some subset of which is
loyal to Player 1, and some subset of which is loyal to Player 2. We will sometimes
ignore geometry and sometimes pay attention to it, so we really have two models
of a state.
In the first model, the state is an interval [0, n] (n is the number of districts) and
an n-districting is a a collection of n disjoint unit-measure subsets of the interval.
In this model, the measure of a subset corresponds to a population, where 1 unit of
population is the size of 1 district. In the second model, the state is a subsetX ⊂ R2
topologically equivalent to a disc, together with a population density φ : X → [0, 1].
We are given that
∫
X φ = n and an n-districting of X is a division of X into n
disjoint connected subsets Xi, each satisfying that
∫
Xi
φ = 1.
Given a district in a districting of a state, the district is loyal to the player with a
majority of loyalty in the district. (In cases of exact ties, we break them arbitrarily,
say, to Player 1). The outcome for a player from the districting is the player’s slate,
which is the number of districts loyal to him.
We now turn to a discussion of natural districting protocols, culminating with
our own.
2.1. One player decides. In this trivial protocol, some external process chooses
one player, and that player freely chooses the districting. Subject to moderate legal
oversight, this is essentially the protocol currently used in most states. In practice,
the external process which chooses the favored player is often control of the state
legislature (which itself is influenced by gerrymandering of state-level districts), or,
as in Pennsylvania, control of the state supreme court.
2.2. Independent agent protocols. If benevolent independent agents are avail-
able in the problem model, then a natural solution is to simply allow independent
agents to draw the districting. In spirit, this is the approach of redistricting commis-
sions such as Arizona’s. Our goal is to eliminate the trust required of independent
agents.
Interesting work by Landau, Reid, and Yershov [7] and Landau and Su [8] devel-
oped protocols with a moderate dependence on an independent agent. Essentially,
an independent agent is used just to choose a suitable division of the state into two
parts, and assign one part (and a target number of districts) to each player. Each
player then freely districts his part, and the result is combined into a districting
of the state. They proved an elegant theoretical guarantee for their protocol under
optimum play: Each player will achieve at least the average of their best possible
slate and their worst possible slate of representatives, among districtings respecting
the split-line chosen by the independent agent.
Apart from the dependence on an independent agent, their protocol has one
other feature which may dissuade its adoption in practice. Since the outcome
of the protocol is a districting in which each player freely chose districtings on
their side of the split, the intended result is a districting of a state in which one
side is gerrymandered for Player 1, while the other is gerrymandered for Player
2. Although this produces a reasonable outcome in terms of the slates won by
each player, which is our primary outcome of interest, such a protocol will not
reduce (and in some cases, may even exacerbate) other maligned effects sometimes
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attributed to gerrymandering, such as entrenchment of incumbent representatives
and the rise of political extremism [9, 3]. Similar problems plague the I-cut-I-
freeze protocol, below. We will give a formalization capturing this phenomenon
(Definition 2.2) and prove that our protocol avoids it (Theorem 2.6).
2.3. I-cut-I-freeze. A very simple multiround districting protocol is to simply
have the players take turns adding districts with the correct population size to an
initially empty districting, until the districting is complete. The following version
of this ensures that completion is always possible.
I-cut-I-freeze: Initialize n to be the number of districts the state is to be divided
into. Initially no districts are frozen. On each player’s turn (while n > 0), the
player:
(1) Redistricts the unfrozen part of the state into n districts;
(2) Chooses one of the new districts to be frozen;
(3) Updates n← (n− 1).
One attractive theoretical feature of this protocol is its slate guarantee (ignoring
any constraints due to geography); the straightforward proof is omitted.
Theorem 2.1. In the geometry-free model, if more than ℓ/n of the state is loyal
to Player i, then Player i can achieve a slate of size ℓ from a n-districting, in the
I-cut-I-freeze protocol.
On the other hand, like the independent agent protocols discussed above, the
I-cut-I-freeze protocol allows each player to freely draw many districts. In par-
ticular, each political party will be able to pack minority populations, reinforce
their incumbents, etc. Although from the standpoint of the final slates for each
player, competition balances the two sides, these features may make this protocol
undesirable nonetheless.
To rigorously capture the power afforded each player by the I-cut-I-freeze proto-
col and the related independent agent protocols, we define the following property
of a districting protocol:
Definition 2.2. We say that a n-districting protocol has the B-target property if
for any i ∈ {1, 2} and any target subset of the state of measure/cardinality 1n of
the state’s total, Player i has a strategy to ensure that at most a 1/B fraction of
the target intersects any single district.
Note that trivially any protocol has the 1-target property. Moreover, 1 is the
largest value of B for which the I-cut-I-freeze protocol has the B-target property,
since, for example, on Player 1’s first turn, he can always create a district equal
to any choice for the target. We will see that the situation for the our proposed
protocol is very different.
2.4. I-cut-you-freeze. The I-cut-you-freeze protocol is the main subject of this
paper. Essentially, the motivation is to reduce the influence a single player can
exert unilaterally on the drawing of any single district. Although each player will
still draw n/2 districts (up to rounding) that are in the final districting, they will
no longer have control over which of the districts they draw in the course of the
protocol end up in the final districting.
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I-cut-you-freeze: Initialize n to be the number of districts the state is to be divided
into. At the beginning of the protocol, Player 1 gives a districting of the state
into n districts, and passes it to Player 2. On each player’s subsequent turn (while
n > 0), the player who has just been given the districting:
(1) Chooses an unfrozen district to be frozen (in the districting received from
the other player);
(2) Updates n← (n− 1).
(3) Redistricts the still unfrozen part of the state into n districts, and passes
the new districting back to the other player.
At the end of a protocol, we have a districting in which half of the districts were
drawn by Player 1 and frozen by Player 2, and vice versa.
Let us define σ(n, s) to be the slate which will be won by Player 1 under optimum
play of the I-cut-you-freeze protocol for n-districtings, in the setting where the state
is modeled as an interval of length n, when the subset of the state loyal to Player
i has measure s. We characterize the outcome of our protocol asymptotically as
follows:
Theorem 2.3. We have
lim
n→∞
σ(n, αn)
n
=
{
2α2 for α ≤ 12
1− 2(1− α)2 for α > 12 .
We can also explicitly characterize the small-n behavior in all cases.
Theorem 2.4. We have σ(n, s) ≥ k if and only if
(1) s 


(n− 1)!!(2k + [2 ∤ n]− 2)!!
2(2k + [2 ∤ n]− 3)!!(n− 2)!! for k ≤ n/2
n− n!!(2(n− k)− [2 ∤ n] + 1)!!
2(2(n− k)− [2 ∤ n])!!(n− 1)!! for k > n/2.
Here  is interpreted as ≥ if ties are broken in favor of Player 1, and > if they are
broken in favor of Player 2; [2 ∤ n] is 1 or 0 according to the parity of n; and n!! is
the double factorial n(n− 2)(n− 4) · · · (2 or 1).
By contrast, for the trivial One-player-decides algorithm (with Player 1 decid-
ing), we would have σ(n, s) ≥ k if and only if s ≥ k/2; Figure 1 illustrates a
comparison.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 2.4. It implies, in particular,
that majority shares are perfectly aligned, up to rounding.
Corollary 2.5. Player 1 wins more than ⌊n/2⌋ seats if and only if his loyal subset
has measure s  n/2.
As mentioned above, we also wish to capture the diminished power either player
has over any single district under our method compared with the previously dis-
cussed independent agent protocols, and the I-cut-I-freeze protocol. It is possible
to prove this rigorously even in a geometric setting where districts are required to
connected, as we do in Section 4.2.
Theorem 2.6. The I-cut-you-freeze protocol for a n-districting has the B-target
property for B =
√
n
2 , in both the geometric and non-geometric models.
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Figure 1. The proportion of seats σn won by Player 1 under
optimum play is plotted against his loyalty α of the state. Bold
lines are the result of the I-cut-you-freeze algorithm, while light
lines are the result of the trivial “One player decides” algorithm
(with Player 1 deciding). On the left is the case n = 10, while the
right gives the curves in the large-n limit. The point α = 12 , σ =
n
2
is marked on both curves. By Corollary 2.5, this point lies on the
σn(α) curve for our protocol for every value of n.
Remark 2.7. It is natural to wonder why our analysis of slates (Theorems 2.4
and 2.3) is carried out in a geometry-free setting, while our analysis of the B-
target property allows geometry. The problem is that in full generality, a setting
respecting geometry can defy analysis of slate outcomes in a way that, we suspect,
would not actually correspond well to the real-world behavior of our protocol. For
example, suppose we model a state as a topological unit disc X , as above, which
has not only a population density φ : X → [0, 1] but also densities φA and φB of
those loyal to Players A and B, where φ = φA + φB . The outcome of our protocol
will now be highly dependent on the geometric relationship between φA and φB;
for example, if we allow that φA > φB everywhere, then Player A will win every
district no matter what choices the players make, and, in principle, this requires
only that s > n/2. By contrast, in an application to redistricting in the United
States, such a consistent relationship between the player loyalties does not occur.
We discuss the applicability of our idealized settings to real-world implementation
of our protocol in Section 5, but roughly speaking, we believe that Theorems 2.3
and 2.4 do capture concrete advantages of our protocol over the One-player-decides
protocol, which we would expect to persist in the real world; namely, that the
protocol is nearly symmetric with respect to which player gets the first move, and
produces generally reasonable outcomes.
3. Slates from optimal play
In this section we analyze the I-cut-you-freeze protocol in terms of the relation
between the measure of the subset loyal to a player and his slate, namely Theorems
2.3 and 2.4.
Let us denote the measure of the subset of [0, n] loyal to Player 1 by sn1 , and the
measure of the subset of [0, n] loyal to Player 2 by sn2 . Formally, the game can be
expressed recursively as the following procedure for a given position, which, with
k = n, s1 = s
n
1 and A = 1, returns the slate of Player 1. For k ∈ N+, s1 ∈ [0, k],
and A ∈ {1, 2}, we define:
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1: procedure Game1(k, s1, A) ⊲ Player A divides first
2: Player A chooses k numbers in [0, 1]: xk,1, . . . , xk,k, such that
k∑
i=1
xk,i = s1
3: Player B chooses an integer ik ∈ [k], where {A,B} = {1, 2}
4: return Game1(k − 1, s1 − xk,ik , B) + [xk,ik ≥ 12 ]
5: end procedure
We also set Game1(0, 0, A) = 0. Now let
Game1(n, s1, 1), Game1(n− 1, s1 − xn,in , 2), . . .
be the procedures (game positions) encountered recursively in the course of the
game Game1(n, s1, 1). We call steps 2 and 3 of each such procedure a round of the
game Game1(n, s1, 1), and number the rounds in reverse, beginning with round n
and ending with round 1. In particular, round t begins with some player choosing
t numbers xt,1, . . . , xt,t.
We let s
(t)
1 and s
(t)
2 be the fraction of the unfrozen state loyal to Players 1 and
2, respectively, at the beginning of round t. In particular, we can set
s
(t)
1 = s1 −
n∑
k=t+1
xk,ik
s
(t)
2 = t− s(t)1 .
Let f(k, s1, A) be the output of Game1(k, s1, A) when the two players play
optimally. (Note that this function always returns the slate of Player 1, even if
A = 2.) Then we have that
f(k, s1, 1) = max
xk,1,...,xk,k
min
i∈[k]
(
f(k − 1, s1 − xk,i, 2) + [xk,i ≥ 12 ]
)
, and(2)
f(k, s1, 2) = min
xk,1,...,xk,k
max
i∈[k]
(
f(k − 1, s1 − xk,i, 1) + [xk,i ≥ 12 ]
)
.(3)
It is intuitively obvious that f(k, s1, A) should be monotone with respect to s1,
and indeed, this follows immediately from induction on (2) and (3):
Lemma 3.1. f(k, s1, A) ≤ f(k, s′1, A) if s1 < s′1. 
The following lemma shows that in optimum play, players will divide the unfrozen
region into districts with at most two distinct loyalty values.
Lemma 3.2. For any Game1(k, s1, A), there are numbers ω ≥ 12 > λ such that
under optimum play, Player A will choose each xk,i to be ω or λ.
Proof. First consider A = 1, let W = {i : xk,i ≥ 12} and L = [k] − W . By
Lemma 3.1 applied to Game1(k − 1, s1 − xk,i, 2) which is encountered at the end
of the round, Player 2’s optimum move is to either choose i = argmaxj∈W xk,j
or i = argmaxj∈L xk,j . So under optimum play, Player 1 will assign an identical
number ω to districts in W , and an identical number λ to districts in L, where
ω =
∑
i∈W xk,i/|W | if W 6= ∅ and λ =
∑
i∈L xk,i/|L| if L 6= ∅. The case of A = 2
is analogous. 
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In round t, if s
(t)
1 ≥ t/2, we say Player 1 is stronger and Player 2 is weaker in
this round; otherwise, Player 2 is stronger and Player 1 is weaker. (Note that, in
general, which player is strongest may change from round to round, even under
optimum play.)
Lemma 3.2 implies that Player A’s move is thus completely characterized by the
choice made for ω and λ. Assuming without loss of generality that A = 1, we see
that Player 2’s response will result either in the value f(k−1, s1−λ, 2) or the value
f(k− 1, s1 − ω, 2) + 1, assuming the remaining gameplay is optimal. In particular,
we have the following:
Lemma 3.3. Given possible choices (ω, λ) and (ω′, λ′) for Player A satisfying
ω ≤ ω′ and λ ≤ λ′, the choice (ω, λ) dominates the choice (ω′, λ′) if A = 1;
otherwise, the choice (ω′, λ′) dominates the choice (ω, λ).
This immediately implies the following:
Lemma 3.4. In any Game1(k, s1, A), Player A, if stronger, chooses xk,1 = xk,2 =
· · · = xk,k in optimum play. In particular:
A stronger =⇒ f(k, s1, A) = f(k − 1, s1 − s1/k,B) + 1.
The following lemma will serve as a base case, if you will, for our larger analysis,
characterizing the outcome of play once the two players are roughly even.
Lemma 3.5. If (k − 1)/2 ≤ s1 < k/2,
f(k, s1, 1) = ⌊k/2⌋;
and if k/2 ≤ s1 < (k + 1)/2,
f(k, s1, 2) = ⌈k/2⌉.
Proof. Assume that (k − 1)/2 ≤ s1 < k/2; the other case is analogous. We prove
the lemma by induction on n. When k ≤ 2, it is trivial. When k > 2,
(4)
f(k, s1, 1) = max
{
maxω,λ{min{f(k − 1, s1 − ω, 2) + 1, f(k − 1, s1 − λ, 2)}},
f(k − 1, s1 − s1/k, 2) + [s1/k ≥ 12 ]
}
,
where the max over ω, λ is taken over pairs satisfying ω ≥ 12 > λ, with the property
that there exists m ∈ [k − 1] such that ωm+ λ(k −m) = s1. Here we can assume
m = k − 1, otherwise, one can easily find ω′ and λ′ such that ω > ω′ ≥ 12 > λ > λ′
and ω′(k−1)+λ′ = s1. It remains to analyze each of the expressions in Equation (4).
First, since
s1 − ω < k
2
− 1
2
=
k − 1
2
,
we have (by Lemma 3.4)
f(k − 1, s1 − ω, 2) + 1 = f
(
k − 2, (s1 − ω)k − 2
k − 1 , 1
)
+ 1.
Then, since
(s1 − ω)k − 2
k − 1 ≥ s1
(k − 2)2
(k − 1)2 ≥
1
2
· (k − 2)
2
k − 1 >
k − 3
2
,
and
(s1 − ω)k − 2
k − 1 <
k − 1
2
· k − 2
k − 1 =
k − 2
2
,
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we have by the induction assumption that
f
(
k − 2, (s1 − ω)k − 2
k − 1 , 1
)
=
⌊
k − 2
2
⌋
.
Second,
k
2
> s1 ≥ s1 − λ = ω(k − 1) ≥ k − 1
2
,
so, by the induction assumption, f(k − 1, s1 − λ, 2) = ⌈(k − 1)/2⌉.
Third, for f(k − 1, s1 − s1/k, 2), since
s1 − s1
k
= s1
k − 1
k
<
k − 1
2
and s1(k − 2)/k ≥ (k − 3)/2, we have
f
(
k − 1, s1 − s1
k
, 2
)
= f
(
k − 2, s1 k − 2
k
, 1
)
=
⌊
k − 2
2
⌋
.
By Equation (4), we conclude that
f(k, s1, 1) = max{min{⌊(k − 2)/2⌋+ 1, ⌈(k − 1)/2⌉}, ⌊(k − 2)/2⌋} = ⌊k/2⌋.

Lemma 3.6. In any Game1(k, s1, A), if Player A is weaker and sA  1/2, the
following strategies for players are optimal:
• Let m = ⌊2sA⌋ if A = 1, m = ⌈2sA⌉ − 1 if A = 2. Player A will divide the
resources such that his proportion in each district is either 0 or sA/m.
• Player B will choose a district where his loyalty is 1.
In particular: if s1 < k/2,
f(k, s1, 1) = f(k − 1, s1, 2);
if s1 ≥ k/2,
f(k, s1, 2) = f(k − 1, s1 − 1, 1) + 1.
Proof. We write this proof for the case A = 1; the case A = 2 is similar. For
s1 ≥ (k − 1)/2, it is obvious from the proof of Lemma 3.5.
For s1 < (k − 1)/2, prove the lemma by induction on k. The base case is k ≤ 2;
we have s1 < 1/2, so Player 1 cannot win any districts, and the claim on f is
obvious.
For k > 2, we first prove that if Player 2’s optimal strategy always chooses a
piece where Player 2’s loyalty is greater than 1/2, then Player 1’s optimal strategy
is as above. Indeed, this implication is clear, since given that Player 2 will choose
a piece where his loyalty is greater than 1/2, Player 1 wishes this piece to have
maximum loyalty to Player 2, by monotonicity. In particular, his strategy will only
produce districts which have loyalty 1 or less than 1/2 to Player 2; equivalently, 0
or more than 1/2 to himself. (The condition sA  1/2 ensures that this is always
possible.) This gives that f(k, s1, 1) = f(k − 1, s1, 2), as desired.
Thus it suffices to prove that Player 2’s optimal strategy will always choose a
district where his loyalty is more than 1/2. We prove that this is the case in response
to any optimal move by Player 1 of the form guaranteed to exist by Lemma 3.2.
By Lemma 3.3, we may assume that Player 1 makes a minimal choice of the pair
(ω, λ). In particular, for any λ ≥ 0, there is some minimum ωλ for which the pair
(ωλ, λ) is feasible, and an interval I = [0, β] such that ωλ is decreasing with respect
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to λ for λ ∈ I and and such that ωβ = 1/2. In particular, it suffices to prove
that for any move by Player 1 of the form (ωλ, λ) for λ ∈ I, Player 2’s optimal
response will be to choose a district where his loyalty is more than 1/2. Finally,
monotonicity implies that it suffices to consider the case of the pair (ω0, 0) since
Player 2’s outcome from choosing district with minority loyalty worsens, and his
outcome from choosing a majority district improves, as λ increases. Of course, ω0
is precisely sA/m, so we may, in fact, assume that Player 1 employs the strategy
that this lemma claims is optimal.
Now, for the sake of a contradiction, suppose that s
(k)
1 < (k − 1)/2 and Player
2 is strictly better off choosing a district where he has minority loyalty. Letting
m = ⌊2s(k)1 ⌋, we have that
s
(k−2)
1 = s
(k−1)
1
k − 2
k − 1 = s
(k)
1
m− 1
m
· k − 2
k − 1 <
k − 2
2
,
where the first equality follows from Lemma 3.4. By the induction assumption, in
round k − 2, the players follow the claimed optimal strategies, so
s
(k−3)
1 = s
(k−2)
1 =
s
(k)
1 (m− 1)(k − 2)
m(k − 1) .
Now we compare this result with the case where Player 2 chooses a majority-loyal
district in round k and a minority-loyal district in round k − 2. It holds that
s
(k−2)
1 = s
(k−1)
1
k − 2
k − 1 = s
(k)
1
k − 2
k − 1 <
k − 2
2
.
Let
m′ = ⌊2s(k−2)1 ⌋ =
⌊
s
(k)
1
k − 2
k − 1
⌋
,
then
s
(k−3)
1 = s
(k−2)
1 ·
m′ − 1
m′
=
s
(k)
1 (m
′ − 1)(k − 2)
m′(k − 1) .
Since m′ ≤ m,
s
(k)
1 (m
′ − 1)(k − 2)
m′(k − 1) ≤
s
(k)
1 (m− 1)(k − 2)
m(k − 1) .
Since in both cases Player 2 wins the same number of districts, this is a contradiction
to our assumption that it is strictly optimal for Player 2 to choose a district where
he has minority loyalty. 
Proof of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4. Combining Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.5 and Lemma
3.6, the recurrence relation of f is solved.
One can easily find the following: for κ = n, n− 2, n− 4, . . ., f(n, s1, 1) ≥ ⌊κ/2⌋
if and only if
s1 ≥ (n− 1)!!(κ− 2)!!
2(κ− 3)!!(n− 2)!! ;
and f(n, s1, 2) ≤ n− ⌊κ/2⌋ if and only if
s1 < n− (n− 1)!!(κ− 2)!!
2(κ− 3)!!(n− 2)!! .
For κ = n− 1, n− 3, n− 5, . . ., f(n, s1, 1) ≤ n− ⌊κ/2⌋ if and only if
s1 < n− n!!(κ− 2)!!
2(κ− 3)!!(n− 1)!! ;
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and f(n, s1, 2) ≥ ⌊κ/2⌋ if and only if
s1 ≥ n!!(κ− 2)!!
2(κ− 3)!!(n− 1)!! .
Writing k = ⌊κ/2⌋ or k = n− ⌊κ/2⌋+ 1 gives Theorem 2.4 as stated. Theorem 2.3
then follows by Stirling’s approximation. 
4. The B-target property
In this section we prove Theorem 2.6. We begin by proving the theorem in the
nongeometric setting, which is simpler.
4.1. Nongeometric setting. In what follows, we suppose that Player 2 wants to
ensure that as small as possible fraction of the target intersects any single district,
and Player 1 opposes this goal. Our analysis does not depend on which of these
players has the first move, however.
Let the measure of the target subset be sT . Then the game can be expressed
as the following recursive procedure, whose value for k = n, s = sT is precisely the
maximum measure of the target that intersects any single district, under optimum
play.
1: procedure Game2(k, s, A) ⊲ Player A divides first
2: Player A chooses k numbers in [0, 1]: xk,i, . . . , xk,k, such that
n∑
i=1
xk,i = s
3: Player B chooses an integer i ∈ [k], where {A,B} = {1, 2}
4: return max{Game2(k − 1, s− xk,i, B), xk,i}
5: end procedure
Theorem 4.1. Under optimum play, Game2(n, sT , 2) has value
sT (n−1)!!
n!! , while
Game2(n, sT , 1) has value
sT (n−2)!!
(n−1)!! . In particular, the I-cut-you-freeze protocol for
an n-districting has the B-target property in the geometry-free setting for
(5) B = min
{
n!!
(n− 1)!! ,
(n− 1)!!
(n− 2)!!
}
∼
√
2n
π
.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on n. When n = 1, it is trivial. When
n = k > 1, first we consider Game2(k, s, 2). If Player 2 chooses xk,1 = · · · = xk,k =
s/k, then the result will be
max{Game2(k − 1, s− s/k, 1), s/k} = max
{
s(k − 1)!!
k!!
, s/k
}
=
s(k − 1)!!
k!!
.
Player 1 can always choose the minimum xk,i, which is no larger than s/k, so
Game2(k, s, 2) ≥ Game2(k − 1, s− s/k, 1) = s(k − 1)!!
k!!
.
Therefore, Game2(k, s, 2) has value
s(k−1)!!
k!! .
Similarly, for Game2(k, s, 1), if Player 1 chooses xk,1 = s, xk,2 = · · · = xk,k = 0,
the result will be
min{s,Game2(k − 1, s, 2)} = min
{
s,
s(k − 2)!!
(k − 1)!!
}
=
s(k − 2)!!
(k − 1)!! .
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Also since Player 2 can always choose the minimum xk,i, where 0 ≤ xk,i ≤ s/k, we
have that
Game2(k, s, 1) ≤ max{Game2(k − 1, s, 2), s/k}
= max
{
s(k − 2)!!
(k − 1)!! , s/k
}
=
s(k − 2)!!
(k − 1)!! .
Therefore, Game2(k, s, 1) has value
s(k−2)!!
(k−1)!! .
To see the asymptotic equivalence given in Equation (5), observe that
min
{
n!!
(n− 1)!! ,
(n− 1)!!
(n− 2)!!
}
=
(n′ + 1)!!
n′!!
=
(n′ + 1)
(n′
n′
2
)
2n′
for n′ = 2·⌊n−12 ⌋. Standard bounds on the central binomial coefficient also suffice to
satisfy the (nonasymptotic) bound on this expression claimed by Theorem 2.6. 
4.2. The geometric setting. Recall that in the geometric setting, the state is
modeled as a subset X ⊆ R2 topologically equivalent to an open disc, and the
measure of a subset C is now
∫
C
φ. Let ST be the target subset.
Then, formally, the game can be expressed as the following recursive procedure,
in which T is allowed in general to be a finite union of topological open discs, and
which for k = n, T = X returns the maximum measure of the target over all single
districts):
1: procedure Game3(k, T,A) ⊲ Player A divides first
2: Player A chooses k districts: disjoint topological open discs of equal measure
d1, . . . , dn, such that the closure of their union is T
3: Player B chooses an integer i ∈ [n], for {A,B} = {1, 2}
4: return max
{
Game3
(
k − 1, cl
(⋃
j∈[n]/{i} dj
)
, B
)
, r(di)
}
5: end procedure
Here cl(·) denotes the closure of a set, and r(di) denotes the measure of di ∩ ST .
Since Game3 is much more complicated than Game2, it is difficult to character-
ize its exact output. Our goal, therefore, is to bound Game3(n,X, c), that is, we
need to find a good enough strategy for Player 2 such that for any strategy of Player
1, the measure of the target subset will be small in every district. Specifically, we
will show that Player 2 can ensure that every district contains at most 2√
n
of the
target. But before we introduce this strategy, we need to establish several lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. If a set C in the plane is a topological open disc of measure s, and
contains a measurable subset A of measure a, then for any positive integer k, C
can be divided into two topological open discs D and C′ (D, C′ are disjoint and the
closure of their union is the closure of C) such that the measure of D is s/k and
the measure of D ∩ A is a/k.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume C is an open disc centered at the
origin. For any θ ∈ [0, 2π], let D(θ) be the (open, say) circular sector of C of
measure s/k starting from the angle θ, let f(θ) be the measure of D(θ) ∩ A. We
can choose θ1, . . . , θk so that D(θ1), . . . , D(θk) partition C (up to boundaries) and
among these circular sectors, we can find two circular sectors D(θi) and D(θj), such
that f(θi) ≤ a/k and f(θj) ≥ a/k. Since φ is bounded, f is a continuous function,
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v
C1 C2 · · · Cm
Cv
(a) Cv = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}.
v0 : 0
v1 : 0 v2 : 0 v3 : 0
v4 : 1 v5 : 0 v6 : 1 v7 : 1 v8 : 1
v9 : 1
r¯(C1) = 1/2 r¯(C2) = 2/3
(b) Cv0 = {C1, C2}; v : α means r(v) = α.
Figure 2. Illustration of Lemma 4.4. (a) shows the structure of
Cv, and (b) gives an example of G, with r¯(G) = 1/2. For c = 1,
v0, v1, v2, v3, v5 all satisfy the conditions of the lemma. Taking v0
as an example, Cv0 = {C1, C2}, |C1| = 6, |C2| = 3, r¯(C1) = 1/2
and r¯(C2) = 2/3 = (4/3)r¯(G).
and we can find an angle θ′ between θi and θj such that f(θ′) = a/k. Thus we take
D = D(θ′) and C′ = C \D. 
By induction, Lemma 4.2 gives the following:
Lemma 4.3. If a set C in the plane is a topological open disc of measure s, and
contains a measurable subset A of measure a, then for any positive integer k, C
can be divided into k topological open discs D1, D2, . . . , Dk (D1, . . . , Dk are disjoint
and the closure of their union is the closure of C) such that for any i ∈ [k], the
measure of Di is s/k and the measure of Di ∩ A is a/k.
As play progresses from the initial configuration on X , players may choose dis-
tricts that divide the remainder of the state into disconnected regions. The following
graph-theoretic lemma will allow us to control the effects of such strategies.
Lemma 4.4. Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph with n > 1 nodes. Each node
v ∈ V is labeled by a positive number r(v). For any subgraph C, let r¯(C) be the
average of r over nodes in C. Moreover, let Cv be the set of connected components
of the induced subgraph on V \ {v}. Then for any c ≥ 1, there always exists a node
v such that r(v) ≤ min{c, n/2}r¯(G), and for any component C ∈ Cv,
• c− 1 < |C| < n− c or |C| = n− 1,
• r¯(C) ≤ |C|+1|C| r¯(G).
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Figure 2 provides an illustrated example of the statement of Lemma 4.4 with 10
nodes. To prove the lemma, we will use the following simple observation:
Lemma 4.5. Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph, and let T be a spanning tree of
G. For an edge e = (u, v), let the components of the induced subgraph of T on V \{v}
be C1(e), C2(e), . . . , Cm(e)(e). Without loss of generality, assume u ∈ C1(e), and let
C0(e) denote the subtree of T spanned by {v}∪C2(e)∪· · ·∪Cm(e). Then there exists
an edge e such that r¯(C0(e)) ≤ r¯(G) and for all i = 2, . . . ,m(e), r¯(Ci(e)) > r¯(G).
The strong inequality at the end of the lemma’s statement may seem confusing,
as it could be the case that, say, r(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V . But, in that case, we can
choose v to be a leaf, and then C1(e) is the rest of the tree, so C0(e) is just v itself.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. We find the edge (u, v) with the following procedure. First,
choose an arbitrary edge e = (u, v). If r¯(C0(e)) ≤ r¯(G), continue with e; otherwise,
continue with (v, u). (The desired inequality must hold for one of the two choices,
as they induce the same partition of the vertices, with opposite choices of C0(e).)
Then, while the current edge e′ = (u′, v′) has 2 ≤ i ≤ m(e′) such that r¯(Ci(e′)) ≤
r¯(G), continue with e′′ = (v′, w) for w ∈ Ci(e′); otherwise, terminate with (u, v).
Notice that in the former case, r¯(C0(e
′′)) = r¯(Ci(e′)) ≤ r¯(G). See Figure 3 for an
illustration of the procedure.
This procedure will terminate because each edge can only be considered once.
Moreover, the procedure ensures that for the current edge e, r(C0(e)) ≤ r¯(G).
Finally, the termination condition ensures that for all i = 2, . . . ,m(e), r¯(Ci(e)) >
r¯(G). 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. First, if there is a leaf v of T with
r(v) ≤ min{c, n/2}r¯(G),
then v trivially satisfies the conditions. Moreover, if c ≥ n/2, there must be at least
one leaf satisfying the foregoing inequality, because there are at least two leaves in
any tree. Therefore, in what follows, we assume that c < n/2, and every leaf v of
T satisfies
(6) r(v) > cr¯(G).
Now let the edge whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 4.5 be e = (u, v); we
will show that the node v satisfies the conditions of Lemma 4.4.
For S ⊆ [m(e)], let CS(e) =
⋃
i∈S Ci(e). We claim that for all S ⊆ [m(e)], we
have
(7) r¯(CS(e) ∪ {v}) ≤ r¯(G).
To see this, suppose it fails. If 1 /∈ S, then we get the contradiction r¯(C0(e)) >
r¯(G), since C0(e) = (CS(e) ∪ {v}) ∪
⋃
2≤j≤m(e),j /∈S Cj(e) and r¯(Cj(e)) > r¯(G) for
2 ≤ j ≤ m(e) by assumption. If 1 ∈ S, then we get the analogous contradiction
r¯(G) > r¯(G), since in this case G = (CS(e) ∪ {v}) ∪
⋃
2≤j≤m(e),j /∈S Cj(e).
Note that taking S = ∅ gives the Lemma’s claim that r(v) ≤ r¯(G). Moreover,
since the Ci’s are connected subgraphs of of the induced subgraph on V \ {v} that
partition its vertex set, any component C ∈ Cv must have the same vertex set as
CS(e) for some S ⊆ [m(e)]. Therefore, (7) gives that all components C ∈ Cv satisfy
14 WESLEY PEGDEN, ARIEL D. PROCACCIA, AND DINGLI YU
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
(a) A spanning tree of the graph
shown in Figure 2(b).
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
r¯(C0(e)) = 1
r¯(C1(e)) = 4/9
(b) First step: choose e = (v5, v9).
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
r¯(C1(e)) = 1
r¯(C
2 (e)) =
1/2
(c) Second step: switch to e =
(v9, v5).
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
r¯(C1(e)) = 1/2
r¯(C
2 (e)) =
1/2
r¯(C3(e)) = 1
(d) Third step: switch to e = (v5, v2).
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
r¯(C1(e)) = 1/2
r¯(
C
2
(e
))
=
1
/
2
r¯(C3(e)) = 2/3
(e) Fourth step: switch to e = (v2, v0).
v0
v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
v9
r¯(C1(e)) = 1/2
r¯(
C
2
(e
))
=
1
(f) Fifth step: switch to e = (v0, v1).
Figure 3. The procedure described in Lemma 4.5, applied to the
graph of Figure 2(b).
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r¯(C ∪ {v}) ≤ r¯(G), or, since r(v) ≥ 0, that
r¯(C) ≤ |C|+ 1|C| r¯(G).
This is the second requirement the lemma places on components C ∈ Cv.
To establish the first, consider a nonempty S ⊆ [m(e)]. Observe that CS(e)∪{v}
contains at least one leaf of T . Using (6), we have
(8) r¯(CS(e) ∪ {v}) > cr¯(G)|CS(e)|+ 1 .
Now (7) and (8) imply that
(9) |CS(e)|+ 1 > c.
Moreover, if |C| 6= n− 1, that is, [m(e)] \ S 6= ∅, then (9) gives that
(10) |C| = n− |C[m(e)]\S(e)| − 1 < n− c,
completing the proof. 
The significant source of complication in Game3 is that the state may be dis-
connected during play. In order to illustrate our strategy clearly, we will need to
classify the components of the active part of the state into 3 types. At the be-
ginning, if the size/measure of the state is odd, the initial component (the whole
state) is Type 1; otherwise, it is Type 2. If a component (of any type) is split into
several smaller components, these components are also assigned Type 1 or Type 2
according to the parity of their size. If a player freezes a district in a component,
but keeps the component connected, then the type of the component changes as
follows:
• Type 1 becomes Type 2;
• Type 2 becomes Type 1 if chosen by Player 1, and becomes Type 3 if chosen
by Player 2;
• Type 3 becomes Type 2.
Note that at any point, a component with an even number of districts is Type
2, while a component with an odd number of districts is Type 1 or Type 3. Our
strategy for Player 2 is as follows.
• If it is Player 2’s turn to cut, for each connected component C, there is
a topological open disc C′ whose closure is C. Then by applying Lemma
4.3, he divides it into districts such that the proportion of the target is the
same in every district.
• If it is Player 2’s turn to freeze, he plays in a component of Type 1 if
available, and otherwise in component of Type 2. (We will prove that one
of these types is always available to him.) To choose the district to freeze,
Player 2 regards the presented districting of his selected component as a
planar graph, with districts as vertices and edges corresponding to shared
boundaries of positive length. He applies Lemma 4.4 to this graph with
c = 3 and freezes the district corresponding to the vertex v given by the
lemma.
Depending on which player freezes first and the parity of the measure of the
original state, a given districting game is either of odd type, where Player 2 is
always presented with an odd number of districts when it is his turn to freeze, of
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of even type, where he encounters an even number of districts when it is his turn
to freeze.
Lemma 4.6. In an odd type instance of Game3, there will never exist component
of Type 3 if Player 2 plays as above.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of the parities and Player 2’s preference to
play in Type 1 components. Note that there are initially no Type 3 components
and only Player 2’s freezes can create such components. In particular, we prove by
induction that immediately before Player 2’s kth turn to freeze a district, there are
no Type 3 components. Note that since the game is of odd type, this induction
hypothesis implies that there is at least one Type 1 component before his kth turn
to freeze. Player 2’s strategy will thus freeze a district in a Type 1 component, and
no Type 3 components will be created on his kth turn, meaning that immediately
before his (k+1)st turn to freeze, no Type 3 components will exist, as desired. 
Lemma 4.7. At any point, there exists at most one component of Type 3. If it is
Player 2’s turn to freeze, there exists at least one component of Type 1 or 2.
Proof. Note that the first claim of the Lemma implies the second: Indeed, if it is
Player 2’s turn to freeze, and the only component available is of Type 3, then the
game is of odd type, and this contradicts Lemma 4.6.
To prove the first claim, we proceed again by induction. Suppose a choice by
Player 2 increased the number of Type 3 components; in this case, there were no
Type 1 components available, and by Lemma 4.6, the game is of even type; this
implies the number of Type 3 components available was even. Since it is at most 1
by assumption, there were no Type 3 components available, and thus the number
of Type 3 components can only increase to 1, as claimed. 
For each connected component C, define r(C) as the ratio of the target in C,
i.e.,
r(C) =
∫
C∩ST φ∫
C φ
.
The following lemma establishes an upper bound on r(C) according to its type.
Lemma 4.8. Let r0 = r(X), where X is the initial state. For any sequence
(a1, a1, a2, . . . , ak), let q(a1, a2, . . . , ak) =
∏k
i=1
ai
ai−1 . At any step of the game,
for any connected component C of measure s:
• if C is Type 1,
r(C) ≤ r0 · q(s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , n′′);
• if C is Type 2,
r(C) ≤ r0 · q(s+ 1, s+ 3, . . . , n′′);
• if C is Type 3,
r(C) ≤ r0 · q(s+ 1, s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , n′′),
where n′′ = 2⌊(n− 1)/2⌋+ 1.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on s. At the beginning of the game, it is
trivially true. Now suppose a component C is chosen, there are two cases, according
to whether the component is split by frozen district.
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First, we consider the case where the component is still connected after the
move. After removing a district from C, let the new component be C′ and suppose
it contains s districts. If it is Player 1’s turn to freeze, then r(C′) = r(C); otherwise,
r(C′) ≤ s+1s r(C) = q(s+1)r(C). For any possible type change, one can easily verify
that r(C′) satisfies the inequality; here we only take changes from Type 2 to Type
3 as an example:
r(C′) ≤ q(s+ 1)r(C) ≤ q(s+ 1) · r0 · q(s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , n′′)
= r0 · q(s+ 1, s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , n′′),
where the second inequality holds by the induction assumption.
Second, we consider the case where smaller components emerge. Let one of the
new components be C′ and suppose it contains s districts. If it is Player 1’s turn to
freeze, then we have r(C′) = r(C) and |C′| ≤ |C| − 2. In this case, one can easily
verify that r(C′) satisfies the inequalities.
If it is Player 2’s turn to freeze, then we have r(C′) ≤ s+1s r(C), and C contains
more than s+ c districts by Lemma 4.4 (as s = |C′| < |C| − c). This case is more
complicated, and we have to enumerate types of C′ and C – both can be Type 1
or 2. Let us first take C′ of Type 1 and C of Type 2 as an example. Suppose C
contains s+ 2a+ 1 districts, then
r(C) ≤ r0 · q(s+ 2a+ 2, s+ 2a+ 4, . . . , n′′).
In order to ensure
q(s+ 1)r(C) ≤ r0 · q(s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , n′′),
we only need to make sure
q(s+ 1) ≤ q(s+ 2, s+ 4, . . . , s+ 2a).
Since c = 3 and c < s < s + 2a + 1 − c, we have a ≥ 2 and s ≥ 4, which satisfies
the inequality above. Similarly, one can easily verify that when both C′ and C are
Type 1, c ≥ 2 is enough; when C′ is Type 2, c ≥ 1 is enough. Since we let c = 3
when applying Lemma 4.4, r(C′) satisfies the inequalities. 
Proof for Theorem 2.6. For any component C of any type, by Lemma 4.8,
r(C) ≤
{
r0 · n
′′!!(s−2)!!
(n′′−1)!!(s−1)!! , if C is Type 2,
r0 · s+1s · n
′′!!(s−1)!!
(n′′−1)!!s!! , otherwise.
If Player 1 freezes a district d from C, r(d) = r(C). If Player 2 freezes a district
d from C, by Lemma 4.4 (with c = 3), r(d) ≤ min{3, s/2}r(C) if s > 1, otherwise
r(d) = r(C). Therefore, for any d,
r(d) ≤ r0 · n
′′!!
(n′′ − 1)!! ·max
{
2, max
k∈N+
{
min{3, (2k − 1)/2} 2k
2k− 1
(2k − 2)!!
(2k − 1)!!
}
,
max
k∈N+
{
min{3, k} (2k− 2)!!
(2k− 1)!!
}}
= r0 · n
′′!!
(n′′ − 1)!! ·max
{
2,
3 · 6!!
7!!
,
3 · 4!!
5!!
,
2 · 2!!
3!!
}
= 2r0 · n
′′!!
(n′′ − 1)!! .
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Since
n′′
n′′ − 1 ≤
√
n′′
n′′ − 2 ,
by induction on n′′, one can easily find
n′′!!
(n′′ − 1)!! ≤
√
n′′ ≤ √n.
That is,
r(d) ≤ 2r0
√
n.
In other words, d contains at most 2√
n
of the target. 
5. Limitations and further questions
We have analyzed optimum play of the I-cut-you-freeze protocol in idealized set-
tings; in actual applications to redistricting, real-world constraints would interfere
with optimum play. For example, our analysis considers a district with 50.1% loy-
alty to Player A to be controlled by that player, whereas in a real-world setting,
a Player would want a more comfortable loyalty margin to consider a district safe.
Apart from this thresholding issue, two other simplifications in our model stand
out:
• Geometric constraints on districts. In the United States, Congres-
sional districts are required to be connected, but in many states, are also
required to be geometrically “nice” in other less-precise ways. One common
term used in state-by-state requirements on districts is that they be “com-
pact”, which is supposed to limit the extent to which districts have intricate
drawn out structure. Various metrics have been proposed to quantify the
“compactness” of a district [6]; one of the simplest is the ratio 4πAD/P
2
D,
where here AD and PD are the area and perimeter of the district, respec-
tively. Note that with this normalization, the measure takes a value in (0, 1].
Other common requirements include respect for geographical phenomena
such as cities, counties, etc.
Our analysis necessarily ignores these geometric constraints on the dis-
tricts. (It should be noted that there are no precise and agreed upon def-
initions of what constitutes a valid district in any particular state, and in
practice, many Congressional districts seem to flaunt natural interpreta-
tions of these constraints.)
• Mixed populations. Theorem 2.4 concerns a model of redistricting in
which districts can be assembled with essentially arbitrary collections of
voters among those voters remaining in the unfrozen part of the state. In
practice, however, Democrats and Republicans are sometimes neighbors,
and it is generally impossible to draw a district which is 100% loyal to
party A or party B, as is sometimes an optimum move for our protocol
(i.e., as from Lemma 3.6).
It may be of theoretical interest to analyze our protocol in richer models motivated
by these complications.
That said, we believe it is reasonable to infer basic real-world properties of
our protocol from our rigorous analysis in idealized settings. Let us first consider
Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 concerning the slate which will result from optimum play in
our algorithm. For these results, it is reasonable to suspect that the idealized model
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we work in has a significant effect on the precise results we obtain. In particular, our
proof is based on the feasibility of two types of moves for the players: Lemma 3.4
requires a player to divide a region into districts with similar proportions of voters
loyal to each party, while Lemma 3.6 also requires him to draw some districts with
pure loyalty for one party. Obviously, neither of these moves is perfectly possible to
emulate in a real-world situation; both players will be handicapped to some degree.
Nevertheless, we consider the key conclusion of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 to be
not the particular formula for the slate won by each player in our protocol, but
instead the general feature that our protocol does shift the unbalanced seat/loyalty
curve from the “One-player-decides” protocol to an (asymptotically) symmetric
curve (recall Figure 1). In some sense, the key point of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4
is just that the protocol produces a result within reason, and that neither player
gains a significant advantage from the choice of who is assigned the first move in
the protocol; we expect that both of these properties would persist in real-world
applications.
For Theorem 2.6 we believe there is actually relatively little lost in our abstrac-
tion of the real-world problem. Much of our analysis (e.g., Lemma 4.4) concerns the
case where Player 2 is choosing which district to freeze after Player 1 has divided
the state; this part of our analysis holds regardless of what geometric constraints
are imposed on the divisions made by Player 1 on his turn. When Player 2 must
divide a region, our analysis directs him to divide the target evenly among many
districts. In practice, divisions with the general feature of dividing a target among
many districts are generally quite easy to construct, and thus we expect that our
protocol would retain a property similar in spirit to the assertion of Theorem 2.6.
The main takeaway from Theorem 2.6 is not the precise threshold of B for which
the protocol has the B-target property, but the fact that neither player will be able
to completely direct the composition of any particular district; to some approxima-
tion, we expect this property to survive in real-world implementations.
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